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Abstract. Over the last years, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attacks have become an increasing threat on the Internet, with recent
attacks reaching traffic volumes of up to 500 Gbps. To make matters
worse, web-based facilities that offer “DDoS-as-a-service” (i.e., Booters)
allow for the layman to launch attacks in the order of tens of Gbps in
exchange for only a few euros. A recent development in networking is
the principle of Software Defined Networking (SDN), and related tech-
nologies such as OpenFlow. In SDN, the control plane and data plane of
the network are decoupled. This has several advantages, such as central-
ized control over forwarding decisions, dynamic updating of forwarding
rules, and easier and more flexible network configuration. Given these
advantages, we expect SDN to be well-suited for DDoS attack mitiga-
tion. Typical mitigation solutions, however, are not built using SDN.
In this paper we propose to design and to develop an OpenFlow-based
mitigation architecture for DDoS attacks. The research involves looking
at the applicability of OpenFlow, as well as studying existing solutions
built on other technologies. The research is as yet in its beginning phase
and will contribute towards a Ph.D. thesis after four years.
1 Introduction
While Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have been long noted in
the literature, it was not until a large group of attacks referred to as “opera-
tion payback” in 2010 by WikiLeaks supporters that the general public better
understood the power of such attacks. As part of this group of attacks, the
websites of MasterCard and Visa were brought down entirely, and PayPal ’s
website was notably disrupted [1,2]. Ever since, we have seen a rapid increase in
DDoS attacks in occurrence and magnitude. The “Spamhaus attack” is a noto-
rious example [3]. While its 300 Gbps traffic peak created the largest-ever-seen
DDoS attack at the time, it has since been surpassed by attacks up to sheer
volumes of 500 Gbps [4,5]. These types of attacks use core parts of the Internet
infrastructure to amplify traffic (e.g., the Domain Name System (DNS)) and
can be launched without an underlying botnet. As they operate at the network
and transport layers [6], they are nearly impossible to mitigate with strictly on-
premise solutions. To make matters worse, the ability to launch such attacks is
nowadays no longer limited to people with advanced technical skills. Contrarily,
“DDoS-as-a-Service” providers, i.e., Booters [7], allow anyone to perform attacks
in the order of tens of Gbps in exchange for only a few euros. As a result of the
increased threat of DDoS attacks, a market for mitigation solutions was created,
which gave rise to DDoS Protection Service (DPS) providers such as Akamai
Prolexic [8], CloudFlare [9] and Verisign [10].
A recent development in networking technology that has attracted a lot of at-
tention from the research community is the Software Defined Networking (SDN)
principle [11, 12]. In SDN, the control plane and data plane of the network are
decoupled. This decoupling has many advantages, such as centralized control
over forwarding decisions, dynamic updating of forwarding rules, and easier and
more flexible network configuration. OpenFlow [13] is the most commonly de-
ployed SDN technology. Considering the characteristics of SDN, we expect it to
be well-suited for DDoS attack mitigation [14].
Despite SDN’s potential for DDoS attack mitigation [15], we observe that
existing solutions rely on other techniques. For example, solutions offered by
‘cloud-based’ DPS providers rely on DNS anycast and Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) announcements. Moreover, there are challenges when it comes to SDN
itself, such as the performance of programmable devices, and its susceptibility
to attacks [16,17]. The aim of this research, therefore, is to investigate the appli-
cability of OpenFlow-enabled SDN for DDoS attack mitigation, and to propose
and develop an architecture to this end.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the research
questions and approach for this work are detailed. Some of the preliminary steps
taken are presented in Section 3, and in Section 4 we conclude this paper.
2 Goal, Research Questions and Approach
The goal of this research is to evaluate OpenFlow for use in DDoS attack mit-
igation, and to design and to develop a mitigation architecture. By using the
advantages of OpenFlow, such an architecture is expected to allow for attacks
to be mitigated in an early stage, i.e., closer to the Internet backbone and fur-
ther away from the target, in a flexible and scalable manner. In addition, an
OpenFlow-based architecture may allow, to some extent, the protected entity to
control routing, which could have benefits. In support of achieving this goal we
have defined the following main research question.
RQM : Can we use OpenFlow in a DDoS attack mitigation architecture,
and how will such an architecture operate?
Our approach to answering RQM is primarily measurement-based, in which
measurements are first focussed on assessing the applicability of OpenFlow-
enabled devices for DDoS mitigation, and later shift towards the architecture
operation. In the subsections to follow we will divide the main research question
in sub-questions, and discuss, for every sub-question, the envisioned approach.
2.1 The Applicability of OpenFlow-based SDN
In the context of researching the applicability of OpenFlow-based SDN for a
mitigation architecture, the following sub-questions are defined.
RQM.1 : What do DDoS attack mitigation solutions based on tech-
nologies other than SDN look like, and how do they operate? The
purpose of this research question is to thoroughly study other solutions, and
investigate where OpenFlow-based SDN can excell, and where it may fall
short in comparison. Typical solutions based on BGP and DNS anycast, for
example, re-route all traffic at the network layer (L3) through ‘scrubbing
centers’, i.e., data centers where traffic is cleansed. This way of operating
needs to be studied for comparative purposes.
RQM.2 : How applicable is OpenFlow to the end of DDoS attack
mitigation, in terms of flexibility, performance, and scalability? The
specification of OpenFlow may be different from the performance and scal-
ability actually offered by OpenFlow implementations. This question serves
to quantify the flexibility, performance, and scalability of OpenFlow.
To approach RQM.1, we will study mitigation solutions offered by DPS
providers; solutions deployed at backbone providers, ISPs, and National Re-
search and Education Networks (NREN); and other type of solutions, such as
traditional firewalls or vendor-specific solutions. Part of this study will include
large-scale measurements using DNS, which will reveal statistics about which
domains use (or migrate to) cloud-based DPS providers. Furthermore, using
DNS we can study how parts of DPS architectures based on DNS anycast (e.g.,
CloudFlare) operate and behave. We will also perform comparative benchmarks
between transport layer (L4) filtering with OpenFlow and traditional firewalls or
vendor-specific implementations, such those based on [18]. We will also perform
measurements to study if re-routing everything at L3 is efficient. Our approach
for RQM.2 will include benchmarks of specific OpenFlow-enabled device imple-
mentations, for example to see how well forwarding devices behave when rules
are frequently dynamically modified. This type of benchmarks will be done in
lab settings, as well as in production networks.
2.2 Architecture Requirements
In the context of architecture requirements, the following sub-question is defined.
RQM.3 : What are the requirements of an OpenFlow-based mit-
igation architecture for DDoS attacks? This research question serves
to get a thorough technical understanding of how an architecture needs to
operate, what its performance requirements are, and how it can be scalable
and be flexible. Its design should also account for the notion that multiple
organisations are likely to be involved, which will give rise to legal and ethical
questions, such as about net neutrality.
The approach we will take to answer RQM.3 involves interviewing opera-
tors of software defined networks [12] to reveal how current SDN topologies are
deployed, what the challenges are, if and how control over routing is currently
realized, and under which conditions dynamic routing allows for DDoS attack
mitigation. Non-technical issues (e.g., ethical and legal) can also be identified
this way. The approach also involves measurements of preliminary architecture
setups in a lab setting to measure how different parts interact. This will allow us
to benchmark architecture designs, review requirements, and steer architecture
design choices.
The overall approach, as identified in the preceding sections, will be iterative.
This is due to several reasons. First, the consequences of design choices may
affect architecture scalability and performance. Second, results from one research
question may lead to revisiting others.
3 Preliminary steps
This section briefly describes some preliminary steps taken to achieve the goal of
the proposed research. We recently deployed a large-scale measurement frame-
work based on DNS. It uses the full .com, .net and .org zones to perform DNS
queries for about 142 million domain names daily. Given that several record
types are of interest, billions of queries are performed per day. The measure-
ment framework is used for different research efforts, but in the context of this
work it is used as follows. By mapping address responses of domains (i.e., A and
AAAA) to Autonomous System (AS) numbers, the use of DPS providers (e.g.,
CloudFlare) can be identified. Name Server (NS) responses can be used to the
same end. This type of analysis allows us to evaluate statistics on the use of,
and migration over time to, DPS providers.
4 Final considerations
During the first four months of this Ph.D research, the preliminary steps pre-
sented in Section 3 were taken. The main goal of this work (as described in
Section 2) should be achieved within a period of four years, as part of a Ph.D
thesis. During this time, this research is expected to benefit from the network of
contacts the University of Twente (UT) has, such as those in the context of EU
FP7 FLAMINGO NoE.
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